We generalize the standard purchase incidence model to allow for the possibility that customers may return unwanted items. When a firm allows the return of previously purchased merchandise, it provides customers with an option that has measurable value.
1.

Introduction
The high incidence of product returns costs manufacturers and retailers dearly, with an estimated $100 billion lost annually through product depreciation and management of the returns process (Blanchard 2005 ). Yet the incidence of returns is at least partially attributable to firms' own policies. Retailers could reduce the incidence by making returns more difficult and/or more costly for customers. Managers recognize this opportunity in interviews, but express concerns that implementing more costly return policies may upset their customers and damage demand. Surprisingly, none of the retailers that we interviewed had varied their return policies and measured this trade-off.
A possible explanation for the lack of measurement is that return policies are set by the market, with every retailer forced to adopt the same policy. However, a review of returns policies across different retailers reveals wide variation in their policies, even within the same product market. For example, while apparel retailer Coldwater Creek allows returns of any merchandise at any time, many of its competitors require that returns occur within 30 or 60 days. The variation in policies is even starker when it occurs within the same firm. There are numerous examples of a single firm implementing different policies in different product categories: Sear's has more restrictive return policies for home electronics and mattresses than for other categories (Merrick and Brat 2005) . There are even examples of policies varying across customers: Macy's Elite & Platinum Cardholders do not have to pay the cost of return postage, in contrast to other Macy's customers who do incur this cost. 1 Selecting an optimal returns policy requires balancing both demand and cost implications. A liberal returns policy allows customers to physically inspect the product in their home before the transaction is finalized. Allowing customers to return unwanted merchandise increases customers' expected utility, which increases demand. Restricting return policies reduces the value of this option to customers, reducing both returns and demand. Although retailers are 1 At an informal level, discussion with colleagues revealed many anecdotes in which retailers apparently relaxed their return policies for frequent customers. There is also at least one documented example of a retailer banning customers because their propensity to return items was too high. In 2003 the Boston Globe reported that two sisters had been banned from all 21 stores in the Filene's Basement department store chain because of "a history of excessive returns" (Mohl 2003) . Similarly, many catalog retailers suppress catalog mailings to customers who return a high proportion of their items.
often aware of this trade-off, measuring the resulting costs and benefits is difficult. While most remote retailers have developed policies for varying catalog content through randomized split sample tests, they generally lack the infrastructure to vary post-transaction returns policies across different randomly selected customer samples. In this paper we use historical data to offer an alternative solution to the problem. Using a structural model of customer demand and returns, we estimate the impact of varying a retailer's returns policy on customer behavior and derive the resulting profit implications. The profit calculation explicitly trades off the opportunity cost of lost demand when returns are more difficult with the additional product depreciation and administrative costs when the returns policy is relaxed.
Our paper makes two generalizable contributions. First, we provide a tool that allows mangers to identify opportunities to vary return policies across product categories and/or customer segments. An important output of the model is that for each customer we quantify the option value of returning unwanted merchandise. This option value varies across customers due to differences in demand and both intrinsic and extrinsic return costs. The option value also varies across product categories, reflecting different levels of customer uncertainty about product fit, together with differences in customer preferences. In an empirical application, using data from a mail order apparel catalog, we confirm that the potential impact on demand is large. For example, in the women's footwear category, the opportunity to return unwanted footwear increases net category demand by 55%. More restrictive returns policies would hurt both demand and profits in this category. Yet in other categories, such as men's tops, customers place less value on the return option, so that additional restrictions on returns could increase firm profits. Our model also distinguishes customers who place little value on the return option from those customers who place a lot of value on the option. Retailers may use these estimates to help evaluate whether to relax their return policies to customers who purchase over the Internet (for example), while tightening their policies for customers who purchase in their stores.
The second generalizable contribution of the paper concerns the accuracy of demand estimates.
Previous demand models generally either ignore returns and focus on gross demand, or they omit returns and estimate net demand. Unfortunately, by failing to explicitly account for returns, both of these "standard" approaches yield bias. Although we delay reporting complete findings until later in the paper, the potential magnitude of the bias is illustrated in 2 In both cases the elasticity estimates from the standard model under-estimate the true elasticities by almost 50%. Further investigation reveals that the size of the bias depends upon how much customers value the return option; the higher the option value the higher the resulting bias. Moreover, the bias may go in different directions, and so we cannot simply assume that the elasticities from the standard model under-estimate the true elasticities. We conclude that obtaining accurate elasticity estimates requires that we account for customers' return behavior.
Scope of the Study
It is important to clarify that this paper focuses on returns of unwanted merchandise by customers. Another common reason for returns is recycling of consumed merchandise for remanufacturing. For example, printer cartridges, disposable cameras, and automobile parts are often returned for remanufacturing (Rogers and Tibben-Lembke 2001) . This is an 2 In both models the gross demand elasticities reflect the impact of price changes on the number of orders, whether or not the item is returned. The net demand elasticities reflect the impact of price changes on the number of items that are ordered and not returned.
important source of returns in some industries, but is not considered in this paper. We also distinguish customer returns from retailer returns to manufacturers. While the option of returning overstocked merchandise to manufacturers can influence retailers' inventory and pricing decisions (Pasternack 1985; Padmanabhan and Png 1997; and Emmons and Gilbert 1998) this topic is also beyond the scope of the current paper. Finally, we distinguish between warranty returns for defective products and returns for reasons of taste or fit (Davis, Gerstner and Hagerty 1995) . This distinction is well-established in practice, with many retailers adopting different (more liberal) policies for warranty returns of defective products than for returns of products that are not defective. In this paper we focus on returns for reasons of taste and fit.
We also caution that return policies are often designed to combat consumer return fraud, which is now a $16 billion market (Walker 2004) . However, return fraud is largely isolated to physical stores where a deceptive customer may steal merchandise and then attempt to fraudulently return the item. For remote retailers, this is less relevant because there are fewer opportunities to steal merchandise. While fraud considerations are important we do not consider them in this paper.
Previous Literature
The interaction between retail returns policies and customer taste and fit has previously received attention in the academic literature. Much of this work is theoretical, with several papers describing how return policies affect firm profits. This includes a series of three papers published between 1995 and 1998. The first in this series, Davis, Gerstner and Hagerty (1995) , presents a model in which a monopoly retailer sells a single product to consumers who are unsure how much they will like the product. The model predicts that more liberal returns policies can allow retailers to increase their prices because the return option lowers customers' risk and increases their expected surplus. On the other hand, the profits from higher prices are offset by a drop in demand (due to the returned merchandise) and deadweight losses arising from returns costs and depreciation in the value of the merchandise. The authors present preliminary empirical evidence supporting their predictions. In particular, they show that fashion retailers are more likely to accept returns of "regularly priced" merchandise than "clearance" items and interpret this as evidence that return policies are more liberal when the product has a higher salvage value.
In a second paper (Davis, Hagerty and Gerstner 1998 ) the same authors extend their analysis by allowing retailers to vary the "hassle" cost that a customer incurs when returning an item.
They motivate their analysis using a survey of the return policies of 133 retailers. They report that while it is rare to offer only partial refunds (few firms charge "re-stocking fees") it is common for retailers to impose effort costs on consumers by introducing a range of return restrictions. Their theoretical findings show that the optimal return policy depends upon how quickly the product is consumed; the salvage value of returned merchandise; and whether there are opportunities to cross-sell or substitute other items when returns occur. The paper concludes by showing that the return policies amongst the 133 retailers in their sample support these theoretical predictions.
The third paper in this series was published in the economics literature by Che (1996) and focuses on the social welfare implications of allowing customers to return unwanted merchandise. Although seemingly unaware of the two Davis, Gerstner and Hagerty papers, the underlying trade-off in all three models is the same: return policies allow retailers to raise their prices, but customers will return the item if the price exceeds their ex post valuation. In contrast, without a return option, the firm may be able to sell at prices that exceed customers' ex post valuations. Che (1996) shows that a return option facilitates risk sharing, which increases social welfare if customers are risk averse. However, because retailers do not internalize this benefit, too few retailers allow returns compared to the socially efficient outcome.
More recently, Shulman, Coughlan and Savaskan (2006) investigate how restocking fees and information provided by retailers about product fit affects profits. The paper reaches the interesting conclusion that providing more information about product fit can reduce firm profits. This result follows from an analogous insight to Che's (1996) model: information about fit can serve the same role as a post-purchase inspection, reducing customers' valuations of the product. As a result, customers may have a higher willingness to pay in the absence of product information than with the information. A related finding can also be found in Heimann, McWilliams and Zilberman (2001) , who show that product demonstrations can potentially reduce retailer profits.
A separate, though related, stream of literature has interpreted retailers' return policies as a signaling mechanism. For example, Moorthy and Srinivasan (1995) show that a liberal returns policy can act as a credible signal of product quality. These models require that the retailer has private information about product quality, otherwise the retailer has no information to signal.
As a result, the unobserved product features tend to be "quality", rather than "fit" characteristics, and so these findings are perhaps more closely related to the literature on warranty returns than returns for reasons of taste and fit. sample of data from a women's clothing catalog to explicitly measure the relationship between sales and returns. They create exogenous within-item variation in demand using a large-scale field experiment and find that varying the price of a product affects both the demand for that product and the rate at which customers return the product. As interpretation for these findings, they present a model in which the number of returns depends on both the number of customers and customers' "return types". Lowering the price has several effects on the incidence of returns. An increase in demand results in more transactions from which a return can occur.
However, the incremental customers at the lower price may have different return tendencies than the original customers who also purchase at the higher price. The tendency to return amongst the original customers may also change when the price is lowered, as these customers now enjoy additional surplus.
In one of the few other empirical studies measuring customer returns behavior, Hess and Mayhew (1997) , analyze customer returns to an apparel catalog. Their main focus is on predicting the time between purchase and return. Using both actual and simulated data they
show that a split adjusted hazard model is better at predicting return times than a regression model. As part of their analysis, Hess and Mayhew (1997) also estimate an across-item model of return rates and find that more expensive items are more likely to be returned. Their data does not allow them to investigate the within-item variation in returns.
This paper also contributes to an emerging research stream that recognizes the need to coordinate marketing and operations decisions (Ho and Tang 2004, Karmarkar 1996) . While research activity is growing, empirical research on the issue remains scarce. One exception is Kulp, Lee and Ofek (2004) , who conduct a large-scale survey to investigate the value of interfirm coordination between manufacturers and retailers. They find that there are limited gains from information sharing. Collaborative initiatives in inventory management and new products and services can increase performance, but inter-firm coordination on reverse logistics programs may lead to the unexpected consequence of greater manufacturer stockouts. Anderson, Fitzsimons and Simester (2006) offer another recent example of an empirical study in this research stream. They show that the adverse impact of retail stockouts extends beyond the immediate order to also affect demand in future periods. Incorporating these costs into an optimal inventory model leads to a large reduction in the optimal stockout rate.
Structure of the Paper
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In §2, we present a structural model of customer returns behavior, and describe a strategy for identification. We introduce an empirical application of the model in §3 and present findings in §4. The implications are discussed in §5 and the paper concludes in §6.
2.
A Model of Purchase Incidence and Returns
In this section we develop an econometric model of purchase incidence and return behavior.
An important feature of the model is that it allows us to derive the option value of returns at the customer level. This in turn makes it possible to predict how individual customer demand will respond to changes in a retailer's return policies. As we show later in this section, the model generalizes to a standard purchase incidence model when returns are banned by a firm. Before describing the model mathematically, we offer an overview of the customer and firm behavior captured in the model.
Model Overview
The model interprets customer returns as evidence of poor fit between the product and a customer's preferences. Consider the following example: a customer is considering the purchase of a havasu blue bath towel from a mail order catalog. Prior to purchase the customer can inspect a picture of the product and read a brief product description. When the towel is delivered, the customer learns the exact color, texture, size and design. In addition, the customer can now ascertain whether the towel matches other bath items. For some customers, the havasu blue towel is a fantastic fit but for others it is a poor fit, in which case the customer may return the item.
The key element of this example is that fit is not fully observed by the customer prior to purchase. This assumption is well-suited to remote retailing settings, where customers select a product from a catalog or Internet site without being able to physically inspect the product to confirm the suitability of the fit or other physical characteristics. The assumption may also hold in a more traditional retail setting if physical inspection within the store is not sufficient to guarantee suitability. Examples might include home furnishings that need to match existing furnishings in the home, apparel that needs to match other apparel in the wardrobe, and/or gifts and other items where the fit extends to someone other than the purchaser. Also, industry observers have noted that consumers may prefer to try on an apparel item for proper fit at home rather than in a store. Examples include women who shop with their children or customers who are uncomfortable trying on merchandise in public spaces.
The requirement that fit is not fully known prior to purchase also suggests that the assumption is more applicable to durable goods markets, in which it is rare for customers to purchase the same product on more than one occasion. If the customer had already purchased the havasu blue towel there would be little uncertainty about product fit prior to the subsequent purchase.
Of course fit is generally specific to a product, so that previously purchasing the havasu blue towel does not reveal the fit of the Bermudian blue sheets.
In the model we consider a two stage process. In stage 1 customers decide whether to order an item and then in stage 2, after receiving the item, they decide whether to keep or return it. To develop the model, we focus our exposition on a single product category but the generalization to multiple categories is straightforward. To simplify notation, we do not include a product subscript and readers should remember that customers are purchasing a single product from a large category of items.
Model
Consider customer i who is deciding in period t whether to return or keep an item. We assume that:
where
The utility of returning an item is simply the return cost and this is always negative (i.e., U(return) it < 0). Our definition of a customer's return cost includes both the monetary cost of a return, such as shipping or mailing fees, and the psychic return costs, such as hassle and time investment. Note that the return cost varies across customers but does not vary over time. The utility of keeping an item has three components. The first term, µ it , is the deterministic utility that is known by both the researcher and consumer at the time of purchase. We assume that the vector X t contains marketing variables that impact the mean utility level, such as price and promotional information. The vector X t also contains a constant, which allows for a customerspecific intercept that does not vary over time. The third term, it ε , is a standard econometric error term that is known to the customer prior to purchase but is not observed by the researcher.
This error term captures time varying shocks to preferences.
The focus of the model is the second term in equation (2), ψ it , which measures the fit of the transaction. For apparel products, this could be the physical fit of the product or it could be sensory related, such as the color or texture of a fabric. We assume that ψ it is never observed by the researcher and is only observed by the customer after receiving the product. Whether a consumer keeps an item depends on the net utility compared to returning the item. We refer to this as
U , which is defined as:
The product is kept if and for the consumer this is a deterministic decision because
it , ψ it , R i and ε it all are known after product inspection.
We now turn to the first stage to derive the probability that a customer places an order. Prior to purchase, it ψ is unknown but all customers know that this random variable has the following distribution:
Consistent with our earlier description of consumer behavior, we assume that the variance of ψ it is constant over time. The subscript i on the random variable should remind the reader that each customer receives their own realization of the random variable each period. Thus, while a firm may sell the same yellow shirt to different consumers, each person will receive their own independent realization of ψ it .
A consumer has the option of returning an item that has poor fit and incorporates this in her purchase decision. We can write the expected utility from purchasing an item as:
where expectations are with respect to it ψ . Recall that from the consumer's perspective ψ it is the only source of uncertainty in the purchase decision. Using the properties of the truncated normal distribution we can show that the first term on the right hand side of (6) is equal to:
Customer expects to keep the order with probability:
.
The expected utility of returning an item can be written as:
Finally, the probability of returning an item is simply one minus the probability of keeping an item. Substituting these expressions into (6) yields:
The above expression characterizes the consumer's purchase decision. The researcher does not observe ε it and we need to integrate over this to obtain the probability of observing customer ordering at time t. This is given by: i ( )
At first glance, the expression for the order probability in equation (11) does not appear very tractable. However, by analyzing the properties of the H function we can derive an alternative expression for this probability that achieves two goals. First, the alternative expression allows us to compare our model with the standard purchase incidence model and second, the simplification facilitates estimation. We begin by defining as a function of ω = µ + ε and
To simplify notation, we omit the consumer i and time t subscripts from equation (12). The following results are easily shown:
The H function has a negative lower bound, a positive upper bound and it increases monotonically with ω. This implies that as a function of ω has a unique root (i.e., it equals zero for only one value of ω) and this root can be quickly located numerically by a Newton algorithm. Define this root as ( )
Note that ( , R ψ ϖ σ is the value of µ + ε that makes the customer exactly indifferent between ordering and not ordering. From (15) we know that H is monotonic in ω which in turn implies that:
An order occurs iff ( ) , R ψ ω µ ε ϖ σ = + > . Therefore, we define:
where if an order is placed and 0
We can now write the probability of an order as:
Equation (19) is a lot simpler than (11) and easily lends itself to a comparison with a standard purchase incidence model. Before making this comparison it is helpful to summarize the expressions for the three possible consumer decision:
2. Order and Return:
3. Order and Keep:
The corresponding utilities are:
Notice that
and:
For each customer we have a β i vector and one return cost parameter R i . We assume that
Note that this specification imposes the restriction that return costs cannot be negative. This is an important restriction to impose, because otherwise the H function defined in equation (10) will not have a root. We next turn to a comparison of this joint model of demand and returns to the standard model of purchase incidence.
Comparison to the Standard Purchase Incidence Model
The traditional purchase incidence model does not consider the possibility of returns and instead assumes that the latent utility of a purchase is simply:
The resulting purchase probability is:
where σ ε is customarily set to one to aid identification. Comparing this to the order probability in the joint model (19), we see that there is an added term ϖ − in the intercept. Recall that we earlier defined this term as minus the unique root of (12). It satisfies the following properties:
As R → ∞ or 0 ψ σ → the joint model converges to the traditional model. In other words, as returns get increasingly expensive or as the uncertainty about product fit declines, the two models become identical. When returns are too expensive zero consumers will exercise the return option. Similarly, where there is no uncertainty about product fit there will never be returns: all products shipped to a customer are kept. We also observe that the order rate increases as customer return costs decrease or as the uncertainty of product fit increases. In the limit as or 0 R → ψ σ → ∞ , customers purchase in every time period. However, in both situations, returns also increase.
A more precise characterization of these effects can be given by the following expressions for the probabilities of the three possible outcomes.
No Order:
( )
2. Order and Return: 
It is now straightforward to derive the limits on these probabilities when R orσ ψ go to zero or infinity. These limits further illustrate the relationship between our model and the standard purchase incidence model:
Thus, in the "costly return" scenario or the "no uncertainty" scenario, order rates converge to those of the standard purchase incidence model and return rates go to zero. Similarly:
Notice that when consumer return costs are zero, the return rates are different than in the infinite uncertainty scenario. However, it is still the case that varying R and σ ψ in opposite directions has a similar impact on the likelihood function.
3
The Option Value of Returning
The expression
represents the additional utility that a consumer receives because he can return an item that has poor fit. To characterize this as an option value a firm may want to assess how this affects a consumer's conversion rate, which is the probability of ordering and keeping an item. We define this option value as:
3 Readers may wonder why the return rate converges to ½ in the infinite variance case. In this case, the distribution of ψ converges to a distribution with infinite mass in the tails, which implies the probability of any finite interval is zero. By assumption the distribution of ψ σ is symmetric around zero and this leads to exactly half of all orders being returned.
Thus, captures the change in a customer's conversion rate when returns are allowed compared with a scenario where returns are not allowed. While we omit consumer and time subscripts from (38), we note that the option value will vary across consumers and over time.
For example, customers with low values of R
i will have higher option values. Similarly, the option value of returning is greater when items are priced higher. Therefore, the option value of returns decreases if a firm offers a deep discount. These properties of the model will be explored in more detail in our empirical application.
We can also monetize the option value by asking "How much would a consumer be willing to pay to have the option to return an item?" Recall that the term µ = β′X and the X vector may contain the price. We define the customer return premium as:
In Equation (39), π > 0 is the dollar amount a customer would be willing to pay to have the option of returning an item. This value will differ between customers due to variation in consumer return costs, R i , and preferences, β i . Notice that unlike a financial option (such as a put or call option), there is an imbedded consumer cost in the return option equal to R i . To some extent, this implies that part of a consumer's option value is already priced out via their return hassle cost. The remaining dollar value of this option is captured in π. We can also compute the total dollar value of the return option when consumer return costs are zero by setting R i = 0 in the left hand side of Equation (39).
Identification
To begin our discussion of identification, we make the standard assumption that 1. ε σ = In the typical discrete choice model, this assumption is usually sufficient for identification. However, our model of customer returns introduces two additional parameters, R and ψ σ . Unlike the standard purchase model, a customer's return decision also provides us with additional information. The critical question is whether this additional information is sufficient for identifying these additional parameters.
Unfortunately, for a single category, the additional information provide by customer returns is not sufficient for identification. To illustrate this point, we first recognize that one property of
σ is homogeneity of degree one:
This implies that the likelihood is invariant to scale transformations, so that:
σ λθ λ λσ λσ for any λ > 0. Further, our analysis of the limits of R and ψ σ on the outcome probabilities in equations (33) to (37) illustrates that these parameters have similar impacts on the likelihood. Thus, we cannot separately identify these parameters.
A careful numerical study confirms that the likelihood function plateaus in the ( ) , R ψ σ dimension. We conclude that without additional information our model is not identified for a single category.
To solve this identification problem, we pursue a multi-category approach in which we jointly estimate the model for several product categories. We then make the assumption that a consumer's return cost is invariant across these categories. Formally, we assume that:
where R ic is the return cost of customer i for category We believe this assumption is appropriate in our empirical application of customer return behavior for apparel items. A consumer's return cost for shirts is likely the same as their return cost for footwear.
. c
Finally, we also assume that: σ ′ = yields an estimate of the return cost, R i , for each customer. By assuming that return costs do not vary across categories we can then estimate product uncertainty for the remaining product categories.
One limitation of this identification strategy is that estimation requires that we have at least some customers who purchase in more than one category. In our empirical application, we limit attention to only multi-category buyers. However, including a mix of single category buyers and multi-category buyers would be sufficient.
We augment the specification of the unobservable heterogeneity distribution to account for multiple product categories. For each customer we have a β ic vector for each category and one return cost parameter R i . We collect all these parameters in the vector θ ic = (β i1, , β i2, ,…, β iC, ,log R i ) and specify the distribution of θ ic as
Because we place no restrictions on the covariance matrix Ω, this specification allows preferences and marketing mix sensitivities to be correlated across categories. In addition, return costs may be correlated with preferences and marketing mix sensitivities in all categories. In the empirical application we obtain estimates of both the population parameters 
3.
Empirical Application
To illustrate the value of the information that the model provides we consider an application to a mail-order apparel retailer. The company sells primarily private-label men's and women's clothing at moderate price points and most products carry the firm's own brand name.
Products are sold exclusively through company owned distribution channels, which include catalogs, an Internet site and retail stores. The company maintains a strict policy of charging the same prices across all of its channels.
For the purposes of this illustration we focus on a sample of 1,088 customers who purchase from three broad categories of items: women's tops, men's tops and women's footwear. We selected these three categories as demand tends to be independent across the categories. As a result, we avoid the added complexity of accounting for cross-category demand effects. For apparel items, the selling season is typically ten to fifteen weeks in duration and new items are regularly introduced into a category. For example, the summer season features men's short sleeve shirts while winter season features men's long sleeve shirts. Across years, there is variation in patterns, material and designs for all three categories. This regular introduction of new products ensures that there is uncertainty about product fit prior to purchase.
The company has a relatively liberal returns policy. Purchases from any channel can be returned at any of the company's stores, including its factory outlets. Customers can also return by mail using a prepaid pre-addressed label that they can download off the company's Internet site. Customers using this option are charged a small fee to cover the cost of the return postage. There are no time limits on how long a customer can hold an item before returning it and no requirement that the product be defective. Customers are also not required to contact a customer service representative in advance in order to authorize the return and they are not charged any re-stocking fees.
We observe customer purchases over a period of 126 months (10.5 years). While we observe transactions on a daily basis, customers typically place a single order each month. Thus, we use a month as the time interval for our analysis. Each customer's first purchase from the company occurs on or after week 1 in our sample and so we observe each customer's entire purchase history (eliminating any left censoring issues). While the company operates retail stores, the customers that we consider make few purchases through this channel over the period of our data. To simplify the model, we assume that a consumer's information about product fit does not vary across channels. We hope to relax this assumption in later work.
We summarize customer purchase behavior in the three categories in Table 1 . The average probability that a customer orders in any given month is 0.194, 0.148 and 0.122 for women's tops, men's tops and women's footwear (respectively). Importantly, customer return rates differ dramatically across these three categories: men's tops have the lowest return rate (14%) while women's footwear have the highest return rate (29%). Returns reduce the conversion rate, which is the probability an ordered item is kept. We will later use these probabilities as a benchmark, by comparing how they change as we vary return costs. The average interpurchase time ranges from 4.52 months for women's tops to 6.88 months for women's footwear. The firm offers multiple items in a category each month. This poses an empirical challenge of determining an appropriate category price (see Table 2 ). We construct two price metrics. The first is the average price of all items sold in a given month. The average prices are $25 for women's tops, $29 for men's tops and $51 for footwear. For women's and men's tops, prices
vary by approximately plus or minus 20% from the average price. Prices are somewhat more variable for footwear with prices varying by approximately plus or minus 30%. In our empirical estimation, using the average monthly price proved problematic. Estimated price sensitivities were low and many customers had positive elasticities.
To overcome this problem, we constructed an alternative price metric that provided more reasonable price estimates. For each product, we define the % discount as: (regular priceprice)/regular price. We then compute the average percentage discount in each (monthly) period and define a price index as one minus this percentage discount. Summary statistics for this price index are reported in Table 2 . Empirically, the price index provides more reasonable price elasticity estimates. Most customers had negative price sensitivities and, as we shall discuss later, the estimated price elasticities are in the range we would expect. This suggests that customers may attend more closely to percentage price changes than absolute price changes, which is consistent with the literatures on reference prices and price cues. We note that while this price index appears wellsuited to this application, it is not specific to the model, which can accommodate any specification of the price variable (or any other marketing mix variable).
While the formulation accommodates any marketing variable, we limit our analysis in this application to price. The mean utility for category j is denoted by ijt µ and is specified as: 
Results
In Table 3 we report the estimates for the model parameters. For expositional convenience we omit the monthly dummies and customer intercepts from Table 3 . The negative coefficients estimated for the price index is consistent with a downward sloping demand function:
customers purchase more frequently in the category when more items are discounted in a category. These effects are strong across all three categories. The primary parameters of interest are consumer return costs, R i , and the degree of product uncertainty, as measured by ψ σ . The parameter R is of the mean of the distribution of R i for customers in our sample and in Figure 2 we plot the distribution of estimated return costs. As shown in Figure 2 , we observe considerable variation in customer return costs.
Figure 2: Histograms of Customer Return Costs (R)
Recall that our identification strategy normalizes σ ψ for women's tops to 1.0. We find that relative to women's tops, customers have less uncertainty about product fit for men's tops (σ ψ = 0.78 < 1). This is consistent with what we might expect. Women's clothing at this firm tends to exhibit greater variation in styles and fabrics than men's clothing. There is also considerable variation in the styles and fabrics of women's clothing from year to year, while the changes in men's clothing are relatively small. Customers are relatively more uncertain about the fit of women's footwear than women's tops. This is also what we would expect. Because fit is much more precise for footwear than for clothing, it is generally more difficult to evaluate fit prior to physically trying the product on.
Unfortunately the scale of the return cost and uncertainty parameters makes interpretation difficult. As an alternative we also report the average value of the return option, both in terms of the impact on the probability that customers order, and on the change in customers'
willingness to pay (see Table 4 ). Recall that in Equation (37), we defined as the increase in the probability that a customer will place an order and keep the item when returns are allowed compared to when they are not allowed. Intuitively, this represents the increase in the probability of receiving revenue from a customer in a month that can be attributed to the return option. These probabilities can be compared directly with the base ordering probabilities in Table 1 . In Figure 3a -3c we also present histograms of these estimated option values, where each of the 1,088 customers represent a single observation for each category. The findings represent the change in the probability of a monthly order attributable to the return option (Equation 37), and the amount that customers would be willing to pay to preserve the return option (Equation 38). Recall that ∆ represents the increase in the probability of ordering and keeping an item due to the return option. Because the benchmark purchase probabilities include the return option, we can think of ∆ as a measure of the decrease in net demand that would occur if returns were banned. Recall that the benchmark probabilities of ordering and keeping in Table 1 are 0.149 for women's tops, 0.127 for men's tops and 0.087 for women's footwear, while the average change in this probability attributable to the return option is 0.022, 0.011 and 0.031 (respectively). Given this, the opportunity to return items yields a 17% increase in demand for women's tops, a 9% increase for men's tops, and a 55% increase for women's footwear. 4 We conclude that the return option has a substantial impact on customer demand.
∆
We can also compare the return option in dollar terms with the average prices for the items reported in Table 2 . In Equation 38 we defined π as the dollar amount that a customer would be willing to pay to have the option of returning an item when the customer has return costs R i .
As we would expect, these values are highest in the category for which there is greatest uncertainty about product fit (women's footwear). Customers would be willing to pay an average of almost $7 to preserve the return option for footwear but only $3 for women's tops and $1 for men's tops. Note that part of the option value of returns is implicitly consumed by 
What Determines the Value of the Return Option?
Further investigation reveals that the value of the return option is not determined solely by the return costs and customers' uncertainty about fit. The characteristics of the demand function are also relevant. This is best illustrated through an example. Consider two different (actual) customers that have the same option value (∆ = 0.05) for the option of returning footwear. By focusing on a single category we hold uncertainty about fit constant. We will compare the two customers' return costs (R i ), the intercept of their demand functions (β i ), and their price sensitivities (β i,p ). Recall that in the footwear category, ∆ = 0.05 is a relatively large option value ( Figure 3c ) and so we might expect these customers to both have low return costs.
Indeed, for one customer the estimated return cost is approximately zero: this customer purchases 30 footwear products and returns 28 items! However, the other customer with the same option value has a positive return cost (R i = 0.5). How can this customer, who has a considerably larger return cost, have the same option value? The increased option value can be explained by this customer's greater price sensitivity for footwear (-4.1 < -3.3). More generally, anything that increases ι µ makes a return less likely, which leads to a reduction in the option value of returns. For this reason, the option value of returns is decreasing in β i and β i,p (together with R i ) and is increasing in the degree of uncertainty about product fit, σ ψ .
A firm may also be interested in understanding which types of customers tend to have higher option values of returns. This information may allow the firm to develop more general policies for targeting returns. To explore this issue, we obtained 28 demographic variables from the U.S. census. 5 The demographic data is provided at the 5-digit zip code level and we merge this data with our sample using this information. The relationship of these variables to a customer's option value is best illustrated through correlations, which are provided in Table 4 .
They indicate that customers with more schooling, higher income, and higher home values tend to have higher option values. A priori, one may not predict such an outcome. Wealthier and more educated customers presumably have a greater opportunity cost of time, which should lead to higher return costs and lower option values. It appears that what drives the relationship between option value and demographics is not only return costs but also customer preferences (the intercept and slope of their demand functions). It is the joint effect of return costs and preferences that drives these correlations. 
5.
Implications
The previous section illustrated an application of our model to the purchase and return of apparel items. In this section, we illustrate two important implications of the model. First, we
show why modeling customer return behavior is critical for obtaining correct demand estimates.
Second, we show how the model may be applied to develop improved customer return policies.
Demand Estimates
A key intuition from our model is that the opportunity to return an item provides customers with a valuable option. In turn, this increases each customer's demand for the product through a shift in the demand curve. We can illustrate this shift by comparing the aggregate demand curves when returns are allowed with the same function when returns are not allowed. For completeness we compute two types of demand: gross demand and net demand. Gross demand focuses on customers' orders (ignoring returns) while net demand focuses on orders that are kept and not returned. In Figures 4a and 4b , we plot these demand curves for women's tops (figures for the other categories are available from the authors).
The dashed line represents demand when returns are not allowed and the solid line represents actual demand when returns are allowed. As expected, the opportunity to return leads to a shift in both gross demand and net demand. The shift in gross demand is considerably greater due to the large number of customers who do not purchase if they cannot return a product with poor fit. Many of these marginal customers do return their purchased item, and so the increase in net demand is smaller than the increase in gross demand. These figures also illustrate that the shift in demand is greater for low prices than for high prices. For example, in Figure 4a approximately 100 additional customers purchase at the lowest price but approximately 60 additional customers purchase at the highest price. To illustrate the importance of explicitly accounting for returns when estimating demand, we can compare price elasticities from our model with two benchmark demand models. In the absence of a model of customer returns, one option a researcher may pursue is to simply ignore returns and focus on gross demand. We will use this as our first benchmark model and compare it to the probability of ordering from our structural model. Notice that both models focus only on customers' orders but our structural model accounts for the return option.
Another alternative is to model customer demand net of returns (orders minus returns). We can also compare this benchmark model to the probability of ordering and keeping in our structural model. The price elasticities from each of these comparisons are provided in Table   6 . We see that when estimating the probability of an order the price elasticities estimated by the two models are reasonably similar. For women's tops and women's footwear there are no substantive differences in elasticity between the two models. However, there are considerably greater disparities in the price elasticities when estimating the probability that an item will be ordered and kept. For example, in the men's tops category we find that accounting for the return option increases the estimated elasticities. Simply estimating net demand without a structural model of returns leads to more inelastic demand estimates.
The differences in these elasticity estimates result from customers who value the return option.
In a market where customers do not value returns we would expect few differences between the structural and benchmark models. In contrast, if all customers value returns then we would expect to see large disparities in the estimated elasticities. To illustrate this point, we consider the 5% of customers with the lowest and 5% of customers with the highest option values in each category. Similar to Table 6 , we compute elasticities for the benchmark models and our structural model. These estimates are reported in Table 7 .
For customers with low option values, the pattern of results is analogous to Table 6 . But, the results for the high option value customers are strikingly different. Our first observation is that the direction of the "bias" in elasticities can be either positive or negative. For example, when estimating the probability of an order, the benchmark model suggests that women's footwear is more elastic than the estimates implied by the structural model. For men's tops, the outcome is reversed. More importantly, the magnitude of the bias for the high option value customers is large in all of the comparisons. We conclude that modeling customer return behavior allows a manager to both accurately evaluate demand and estimate price sensitivities. Ignoring the option value of returns leads to biased estimates of customer price elasticity. This bias is largest for customers who place the highest value on the return option. In addition, because the direction of bias can be either positive or negative, managers who rely on demand models that ignore customer return behavior cannot easily account for this bias in their decision-making.
Optimizing Return Policies
The structural nature of the model allows us to make predictions about how customers will respond if a firm varies its return policy. By varying a return policy a firm can raise or lower customers' return costs. For example, rather than charging customers for the cost of the return postage, the company could lower customers' returns costs by assuming some or all of the postage cost (as Macy's does for its Elite and Platinum Cardholders). Alternatively the firm could raise the return costs by charging an administrative fee for accepting returns.
We investigate the impact of return policies by computing counterfactuals using different return costs. In particular, we consider return policies of the form:
ˆ, 1,..., .
The benchmark return policy is K = 1, under which all customers face the return costs directly estimated from the data. As we increase or decrease K we can estimate the resulting reduction in the number of orders received, and the change in the number of returns. This in turn allows us to estimate the impact on firm profits.
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To calculate firm profits we first define the gross profit earned from category j with return policyα as:
In this expression we use j m to denote the average profit margin of items in category j, and j c as the firm's cost if an item in category j is returned. This cost includes both the administrative cost of processing the return transactions and the depreciation in the value of the returned item.
In the absence of any information about the actual value of c j we assumed for the purpose of this illustration that it was equal to 35% of m j . For simplicity we also assumed that varying customers' return costs only affects the firm's expected profits through changes in the volume of orders and returns. In practice, some of the options available to change the cost of a return, such as waiving the cost of return postage or charging a restocking fee, could also directly impact the firm's profit function through c j . Modifying (41) to accommodate these changes would be straight-forward.
6 Note that we have kept K constant across customers. This implies that the policies we consider are return policies where all customers are hit by the same percentage increase or decrease in return costs. It is straightforward to calculate the profits from segmented or even individual return polices by allowing K to vary across customers.
In Figures 5a-5c we illustrate the change in the expected profits ( ∏ ) as a function of K for the three product categories. For the women's tops category the current return policy (i.e. K = 1) appears to be close to optimal, although this finding depends upon our somewhat arbitrary assumption about c j . Of greater interest, we see that for men's tops it is optimal to make returns more expensive compared to women's tops. In fact, our estimates suggest that the optimal policy for men's tops is to not allow returns (i.e. K = ∞). For women's footwear, our model suggests it is optimal to make returns less expensive (i.e. K < 1).
These comparisons make intuitive sense. Recall from Table 2 that men's tops had the lowest uncertainty and customers placed less value on the option of returning items in this category (compared to the other two categories). In contrast, women's footwear had the highest uncertainty and customers place greater value on their ability to return these items. Tightening the return policy will have less impact on demand for men's tops than on demand for footwear, suggesting that is it is optimal to offer different return policies across these categories. If these findings are correct we would expect to see them reflected in the actual returns policies that firm's use in practice. For example, we might expect fewer restrictions on returns of footwear than on returns of apparel. As a preliminary test of this prediction, we identified a sample of remote retailers that specialize in either women's clothing, men's clothing or footwear. We used a list provided by Google that includes the name and web address for a large set of remote retailers in each of these categories. We then visited each retailer's website and recorded their return policy.
Our final sample included 44 footwear retailers, 22 men's clothing retailers and 46 women's clothing retailers. The low number of men's clothing retailers reflects the relative paucity of remote retailers specializing in men's clothing. Within this sample of retailers, we measured the time limits imposed on the ability to return items (measured in days after delivery date).
The averages are very similar for men's and women's apparel: 22 days for women's clothing and 24 days for men's clothing. The median number of days allowed is 14 days for women's clothing and 15 days for men's clothing. In contrast, footwear retailers have much more liberal return policies. The mean number of days allowed for customer returns is 45 days and the median is 30 days. The difference in the number of days allowed for customer returns is significantly different (p < 0.01) for footwear compared to men's and women's clothing. We conclude that the evidence is at least partially consistent with the predictions provided by the model. Although we did not observe a difference in return policies for men's and women's apparel, there is evidence that footwear retailers tend to have more liberal return policies than apparel retailers.
Conclusions
We have generalized the standard purchase incidence model to recognize the possibility that customers may return unwanted merchandise. The model reveals how customers' ordering and returns behavior changes when they are uncertain about product fit. Because customers' return costs are at least in part controlled by the firm's own return policies, we can use the model to predict how changes in those return policies affect firm profits.
To estimate the model we had to overcome problems with both tractability and identification.
The tractability issue was overcome by replacing the purchase probability expression with a more flexible function that allowed a direct comparison between this more general model and the standard purchase incidence model. The identification problem arises because customers' individual return costs are confounded with their uncertainties about product fit. We disentangle these two factors by recognizing that a customer's return costs are often fixed across different product categories, while the uncertainty about fit may vary. By estimating the model across multiple categories we are able to separately identify the return costs and the category-specific uncertainty parameters.
We illustrate the information that can be learned from the model by applying it to a sample of data provided by a mail-order apparel company. We use a sample of 1,088 customers who had all made purchases of women's tops, men's tops and women's footwear from the firm. We find that there is substantial variation in option values across customers, and that the impact of the return option on demand is substantial for many customers. In addition, the findings reveal that customers are generally more uncertain about product fit for women's clothing than for men's clothing, and that there is even more uncertainty about fit for women's footwear. As a result, customers place the highest value on the option of returning women's footwear, and the lowest value on returning men's clothing. Our results show that the opportunity to return items leads to an average increase in demand of 17% for women's tops, 9% for men's tops, and 55% for women's footwear.
We also illustrate how varying the cost of returning an item affects firm's profits. As the earlier results suggest, we find that optimal return policies are more lenient for women's footwear than for clothing. We would expect to see this pattern reflected in the actual returns policies that firm's use in practice. To evaluate this prediction we surveyed the return policies at a sample of specialty footwear and apparel retailers. The findings reveal that return policies are generally more lenient for footwear than for apparel, although we observed no differences in return policies for men's and women's apparel.
We highlight the importance of explicitly accounting for the interaction between customer ordering and returns by comparing the elasticity estimates from our structural model with estimates from standard models in which returned items are either ignored or simply deducted from the demand measures. We show that both of these standard approaches yield biased elasticity estimates, and that the magnitude of the bias can approach 50%. As we would expect the size of the bias depends upon how much customers value the option of returning.
Moreover, the bias may yield both under-estimates or over-estimates of the true elasticity, and so managers cannot easily account for the bias in their decision-making.
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